Participants in the South China Sea
Updated: June 13, 2025 and May 14, 2025
August 23, 2024
We are documenting the names and titles of relevant, key participants in the actions and publicity around the South China Sea, and more broadly in the countries in the area. Not all of these countries have a claim to reefs, but they all are relevant to the space. Many Western countries, and Russia patrol the South China Sea and are signing defence agreements. We are also documenting relevant relationships between countries in the region.
We are still working on this list, so a few of the entries may be light on details. All entries are made via open source research. This list is updated periodically.
August 23, 2024
We are documenting the names and titles of relevant, key participants in the actions and publicity around the South China Sea, and more broadly in the countries in the area. Not all of these countries have a claim to reefs, but they all are relevant to the space. Many Western countries, and Russia patrol the South China Sea and are signing defence agreements. We are also documenting relevant relationships between countries in the region.
We are still working on this list, so a few of the entries may be light on details. All entries are made via open source research. This list is updated periodically.
China (PRC)
China
President, Xi Jinping
W.R.T. South Korea and the Yellow Sea:
Hong Liang, director-general of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and head of the Chinese delegation
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun
China believes that the Philippines' actions in the South China Sea are not independent, but part of a "screenplay written by external forces" to smear China. This is important, as it indicates mindset around bilateral agreements with neighbors vs. superpower and regional power (e.g., France) politics.
President, Xi Jinping
- Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, and Chinese Foreign Minister (2025)
- Chinese Defence Minister, Admiral Dong Jun Source
- Political commissar of the Southern Theater Command, and Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Wang Wenquan
- Head of Navy, Commanding General, Hu Zhongming
- Head of the People's Liberation Army, General Liu Zhenli
- Commander, People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, General Wang Houbin
- Political Commissar, PLA Rocket Force, General Xu Xisheng
- Chinese State Councilor, Yang Jiechi
- Chinese Ambassador to Philippines, Huang Xilian
- Senior Colonel Tian Junli, Spokesman at the PLA Southern Theater Command (as of 03/23/2023 and 2025)
- Chinese Defense Ministry Spokesman, Zhang Xiaogang (as of November 2023)
- Chinese Foreign Ministry / Foreign Affairs Spokesman, Wang Wenbing
- Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Ms. Mao Ning (2024)
- Chinese Defence Ministry Spokesman Senior Colonel Wu Qian
- Yang Tao, director-general of the Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs of the China's Foreign Ministry
- Chinese State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong (War on Drugs)
- Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, Chen Jining
- Head of Navy (former): Admiral Dong Jun (now Chinese Defense Minister)
- Commander, People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (former): Wei Fenghe
- Head of People's Liberation Army Rocket Corps (former): Li Yuchao.
- Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian
- Chinese army Lieutenant General He Lei.
- Foreign Minister & State Councilor (former): Qin Gang
- Chinese Defence Minister and State Councilor, Central Military Commission member (former): Li Shangfu
- Ren Yukun, head of the discipline inspection and supervision team and a member of the leading party group at the state-owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC).
- Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun.
- Wei Dongxu, a Beijing-based military expert; Cao Weidong, a military expert and former researcher at China's PLA Naval Military Studies Research Institute.
- Wu Shicun, president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies
- Chen Xiangmiao, director of the World Navy Research Center at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies
- Zhu Feng, a South China Sea specialist at Nanjing University
- Song Zhongping, Military expert
- Wu Xinbo, a professor at China's Fudan University
- Shi Yinhong, professor of international relations at Renmin University of China
- Li Dexia, Associate Professor with the School of Journalism and Communication at Xiamen University, China.
- Xu Liping, director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
- Hu Xin, Assistant Researcher, China South China Sea Research Institute
- Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian
- Chinese spokesperson Gan Yu
- Senior Colonel Tian Junli, a spokesperson for the People's Liberation Army Southern Theater Command.
- Xue Chen, a research fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies
- Ma Bo, an associate professor at the School of International Studies at Nanjing University
- Liu Dejun, Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) spokesperson (January 2025)
W.R.T. South Korea and the Yellow Sea:
Hong Liang, director-general of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and head of the Chinese delegation
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun
China believes that the Philippines' actions in the South China Sea are not independent, but part of a "screenplay written by external forces" to smear China. This is important, as it indicates mindset around bilateral agreements with neighbors vs. superpower and regional power (e.g., France) politics.
China's Ministry of Natural Resources published a new 10-dash line in August 28, 2023 that publicizes their own territorial claims.
China's maritime militia fleet are known for their blue-hulled ships, and are actively operating in the South China Sea, including around the Second Thomas Shoal as recently as December 10, 2023. This fleet is separate from China's Navy and Coast Guard, and are known to be 'patriotic fisherman' by the Chinese Government.
China supports a July 12, 2016 concept (described here) called Nan Hai Zhu Dao, Nanhai Zhudao, or the Four Sha/sands, to explain the logic of their sovereignty claims of the 10-dash line. Here are the four shas:
- Dongsha Qundao (Dongsha islands) which may also include Taiwan
- Xisha Qundao (Xisha or Paracel Islands)
- Zhongsha Qundao (Zhongsha Islands southeast of the Paracel Islands)
- Nansha Qundao (the Nansha or Spratly Islands).
China's maritime militia fleet are known for their blue-hulled ships, and are actively operating in the South China Sea, including around the Second Thomas Shoal as recently as December 10, 2023. This fleet is separate from China's Navy and Coast Guard, and are known to be 'patriotic fisherman' by the Chinese Government.
China supports a July 12, 2016 concept (described here) called Nan Hai Zhu Dao, Nanhai Zhudao, or the Four Sha/sands, to explain the logic of their sovereignty claims of the 10-dash line. Here are the four shas:
- Dongsha Qundao (Dongsha islands) which may also include Taiwan
- Xisha Qundao (Xisha or Paracel Islands)
- Zhongsha Qundao (Zhongsha Islands southeast of the Paracel Islands)
- Nansha Qundao (the Nansha or Spratly Islands).
I read here about China's small, aluminum, lightweight, agile and stealth-capable platforms to drive an asymmetric naval strategy. These are Type 22 fast attack missile boats with an exceptionally large anti-ship cruise missile payload (two quadruple launchers), mounted gatling guns, ECMs, jamming flares, and exceptionally high speed (cruises at 30 knots and bursts to 50 knots). It has shallow draft capabilities as it is super light-weight, drawing only 220 tons.
They have surface search radars, fire control systems (inter-operable across boats), and visual acquisition and fire control systems. These are a networked platform due to the small range and limited capabilities of each individual craft.
This is a littoral vessel that draws 220 tons with a forward-facing catamaran, water jet propulsion and was introduced in 2004. It can target a larger vessel like a cargo ship up to a US Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. We believe the strategy is to send a highly maneuverable swarm of these against a high-value target and launch anti-ship missiles simultaneously while jamming anti-ship defenses. This reminds me of a Barbie doll.
This is a step between a traditional naval warship and swarms of unmanned sea combat vehicles (USCV) operated by Ukraine in the Black Sea.
They have surface search radars, fire control systems (inter-operable across boats), and visual acquisition and fire control systems. These are a networked platform due to the small range and limited capabilities of each individual craft.
This is a littoral vessel that draws 220 tons with a forward-facing catamaran, water jet propulsion and was introduced in 2004. It can target a larger vessel like a cargo ship up to a US Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. We believe the strategy is to send a highly maneuverable swarm of these against a high-value target and launch anti-ship missiles simultaneously while jamming anti-ship defenses. This reminds me of a Barbie doll.
This is a step between a traditional naval warship and swarms of unmanned sea combat vehicles (USCV) operated by Ukraine in the Black Sea.
Starting in 2024, China made more reconnaissance flights around the Philippine Sea and off the coast of Taiwan, whether manned or unmanned UAV and UCAVs. This requires intercepting Japanese airspace to move from the East China Sea and the Philippine Sea near Okinawa. Specifically, China has been flying Y-9 Maritime Patrol Aircraft between Miyako Island and Okinawa to enter the Philippine Sea, patrolling there, then returning. China is also flying between Japan's Yonaguni Island and Taiwan. This circumnavigation is likely testing the waters for an aerial and naval blockade of Taiwan.
In May and June 2025, China broke out of the first island chain and conducted a joint carrier strike force exercise near the island of Iwo Jima, ~750 nautical miles of Guam and well east of Japan's mainland, Taiwan and the Philippines northern islands.
China is very angry and upset (publicly) about how the USA is supporting the Philippines and how the USA is spreading a Cold War mentality, provoking trouble, instigating ideological confrontations, and sowing discord, and being an instigator in the South China Sea.
In May and June 2025, China broke out of the first island chain and conducted a joint carrier strike force exercise near the island of Iwo Jima, ~750 nautical miles of Guam and well east of Japan's mainland, Taiwan and the Philippines northern islands.
China is very angry and upset (publicly) about how the USA is supporting the Philippines and how the USA is spreading a Cold War mentality, provoking trouble, instigating ideological confrontations, and sowing discord, and being an instigator in the South China Sea.
Chinese PLAN Aircraft Carrier Plans
Since 2016, China has been investing in its shipbuilding capabilities. There is a dry dock ikn Hainan Island that is large enough to build a Type-003 Super Carrier, which may have an electromagnetic catapult similar to the U.S. Navy's Ford Class. The catapult is known by the U.S. Navy terminology as EMALS, or Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (we love our FLAs).
This matters because EMALs allow heavier aircraft to be launched, such as the Xi'an KJ-600 carrier-based early warning aircraft (similar to the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye). It also allows for new classes of fighters and Uncrewed Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs).
Hainan and air bases due North are able to house aircraft carriers and long range combat aircraft, significantly strengthening China's ability to project power into the South China Sea.
Since 2016, China has been investing in its shipbuilding capabilities. There is a dry dock ikn Hainan Island that is large enough to build a Type-003 Super Carrier, which may have an electromagnetic catapult similar to the U.S. Navy's Ford Class. The catapult is known by the U.S. Navy terminology as EMALS, or Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (we love our FLAs).
This matters because EMALs allow heavier aircraft to be launched, such as the Xi'an KJ-600 carrier-based early warning aircraft (similar to the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye). It also allows for new classes of fighters and Uncrewed Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs).
Hainan and air bases due North are able to house aircraft carriers and long range combat aircraft, significantly strengthening China's ability to project power into the South China Sea.
